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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court recently issued an opinion,
Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, on the interplay between special
education and disability discrimination law.1 The decision
determines when claims under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
†
Amy J. Goetz received her undergraduate and graduate degrees from the
University of Minnesota and the University of Minnesota Law School, cum laude. She
has worked in education law since 1995, first as a staff attorney with the Minnesota
Disability Law Center, then as a complaint investigator at the Minnesota
Department of Education, and has represented families in private practice since
1999, currently at the School Law Center in St. Paul. Goetz is admitted to the
Minnesota and Wisconsin state courts, the Minnesota federal court, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. Her background
includes serving legal services clients in family law, child custody, adoption and
foster care, housing, and government benefits. Goetz is also the proud parent of two
beautiful adult children with disabilities.
†† Andrea Jepsen is an attorney with the School Law Center, a law firm
focusing on the rights of students and families in education and school law disputes.
Andrea has worked with people with disabilities since 1997 in a variety of roles,
including as an early childhood special education service coordinator, and as a legal
services provider working regularly in the courts and in administrative proceedings.
1. 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
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(Section 504) must be exhausted in special education administrative
hearings before filing suit in federal court under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).2 This decision provides some
much needed clarification to an evolving understanding of how, and
in what manner, federal special education and non-discrimination
laws overlap but maintain separate, distinct, and significant viability
as tools to protect students with disabilities.3
This article first provides an overview of three special education
and disability discrimination laws—the IDEA, Section 504, and the
ADA.4 It next discusses the confusion administrative bodies and
courts have had in applying these laws.5 The article then analyzes the
Fry decision.6 Finally, the article discusses Fry’s apparent limitations.7
II. SPECIAL EDUCATION & DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAWS
A.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

The IDEA offers federal funds to states in exchange for a
commitment: to furnish a “free appropriate public education”
(FAPE) to all eligible children, which includes special education and
related services.8 A FAPE under the IDEA confers a substantive right
to education tailored to meet a child’s unique needs and confers
sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from that
education.9 Parents and a group of school officials together must
craft an individualized education program (IEP) to document a
personalized plan to meet the child’s educational needs.10
Anticipating that parents and school representatives cannot
always agree, the IDEA established administrative procedures to
resolve disputes about any matter concerning the provision of a

2. Id. at 746–48.
3. See id. at 755–58.
4. See infra Part II.A–B.
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 748 (2017) (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(1)(A) (2016)).
9. Id. at 748–49 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), (26), (29)); Smith v. Robinson,
468 U.S. 992, 1010 (1984); Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982).
10. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749 (first citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(bb),
(d)(1)(B); then citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988)).
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FAPE.11 Complaints must first be channeled into an administrative
hearing process.12 This hearing is followed by an opportunity for
judicial review.13
B.

Section 504 & the Americans with Disabilities Act

“Important as the IDEA is for children with disabilities, it is not
the only federal statute protecting their interests.”14 Two federal
antidiscrimination laws also cover both adults and children with
disabilities in public schools and other settings.15 First, Title II of the
ADA forbids any “public entity” from discriminating based on
disability.16 Second, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act17 applies
the same prohibition to any federally funded “program or activity.”18
Section 504 specifically requires public elementary and secondary
schools to provide a FAPE to each qualified student with a disability,
regardless of the nature or severity of the student’s disability.19 The
Section 504 FAPE is accomplished by providing regular or special
education and related aids and services to students with disabilities.20
The aids and services must be designed to meet the individual
educational needs of such students as adequately as the needs of
students without disabilities are met.21
The cornerstone of both Section 504 and the ADA is the
guarantee of equality in participation, benefit, and opportunity for
people with disabilities.22 Section 504 and the ADA demand
reasonable accommodations and modifications to policies, practices,
or procedures when necessary to avoid inequality and, by extension,
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1).
12. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)). The right to an
administrative hearing is broad, encompassing claims for violations of additional
rights enumerated in the IDEA that are ultimately in service of the provision of a
FAPE, including the rights to “the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
13. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2016); id.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2016); Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–32; Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749.
19. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2016).
20. Id. § 104.33(b).
21. Id.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(6); MARGARET C. JASPER, LEGAL ALMANAC: THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 1:1, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2012).
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disability discrimination.23 Both statutes authorize individual redress
for violations, including injunctive relief or monetary damages.24
C.

Confusion in Administrative Bodies & the Courts

Section 504, passed in 1973, was almost immediately eclipsed by
passage of the IDEA in 1975 (known at the time as the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA)).25 The United States
Supreme Court considered the EHA’s special education protections
and Section 504’s disability discrimination protections as two sides
of the same coin of protection for students with disabilities,26 despite
the statutes’ obvious differences in objectives and language.27
Congress corrected that misperception by passing the Handicapped
Children’s Protection Act of 1986, which resulted in the enactment
of a provision in the EHA to allow for preservation of claims and
administrative exhaustion.28 The preservation of claims and
administrative exhaustion provision, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)
(“Section 1415(l)”), reads:
Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or
limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under
the Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Rehabilitation
Act [including Section 504], or other Federal laws
protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except
that before the filing of a civil action under such laws
seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the
[IDEA’s administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to
the same extent as would be required had the action been
brought under [the IDEA].29

23. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016); Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749; Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287, 299–300 (1985).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2016); Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 750.
25. See Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act:
A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 358–59
(1990). In 1990, Congress changed the EHA’s name to the IDEA. See id. at 350 n.3.
26. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984).
27. See id. at 1013 (“We conclude, therefore, that where the EHA is available to
a handicapped child asserting a right to a free appropriate public education, based
either on the EHA or on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the EHA is the exclusive avenue through which the child and his
parents or guardian can pursue their claim.”).
28. The Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372,
100 Stat. 796.
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2016).
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Despite its plain language, this provision has been the source of
significant confusion in the body of administrative decisions and the
courts.30 Specifically, the provision has caused confusion over when,
and for what claims, the IDEA’s administrative proceedings must
first be exhausted. This issue was not directly raised or clarified until
the United States Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Fry.31
For example, after the passage of Section 1415(l), courts
continued to incorrectly apply the view that special education laws
were the exclusive avenue through which children could challenge
the adequacy of their education.32 As a result, protection for students
with disabilities through the ADA and Section 504 remained unused
for decades.33 In addition, some courts applied an almost impossible
burden of pleading and proof as a prerequisite to bringing and
maintaining claims of disability discrimination for school-aged

30. See Peter J. Maher, Note, Caution on Exhaustion: The Courts’ Misinterpretation
of the IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement for Claims Brought by Students Covered by Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA but Not by the IDEA, 44 CONN. L. REV. 259, 275
(2011) (describing the confusion over interpreting IDEA: “Although § 1415(l)
grants parents the right to file civil actions based on other federal laws, such as
Section 504/ADA, it requires that they must first exhaust the remedies available
under IDEA’s administrative due process system if they are seeking relief that is also
available under the IDEA. It is this qualification that courts have misinterpreted and
misapplied.”).
31. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 37 S. Ct. 743, 754–55 (2017).
32. Compare Polera v. Bd. Of Ed. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288
F.3d 478, 488 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The fact that . . . [the plaintiff] seeks damages, in
addition to relief that is available under the IDEA, does not enable her to sidestep
the exhaustion requirements of the IDEA.”), and Charlie F. by Neil F. v. Bd. of Educ.
of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that the plaintiff
cannot avoid the IDEA exhaustion requirement by seeking monetary damages),
abrogated by Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017), with W.B. v. Matula,
67 F.3d 484, 494–96 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that since the plaintiff sought monetary
damages, the IDEA exhaustion requirement was unnecessary), abrogated on other
grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 802 (3d Cir. 2007), and Padilla
ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 in City and Cty. of Denver, Colo., 233 F.3d 1268,
1274–75 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding the plaintiff sought monetary damages to redress
past physical injuries, and had “no complaints regarding her current educational
situation,” so the IDEA exhaustion requirement was unnecessary).
33. See Maher, supra note 30, at 275 (explaining that the Handicapped
Children’s Protection Act of 1985, which “grants parents the right to file civil actions
based on other federal laws, such as 504/ADA, [and] requires that they must first
exhaust the remedies available under IDEA’s administrative due process system if
they are seeking relief that is also available under the IDEA[,]” has been
“misinterpreted and misapplied”).
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students.34 This included requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate
educators acted with “bad faith” or “gross misjudgment” in order to
correct or hold schools accountable for ADA and Section 504
violations “based on educational services for disabled children.”35
Other circuits have applied the same claim-razing standard to
discrimination complaints regarding the education of disabled
students.36
This interpretation has allowed the courts to effectively tamp
down fulfillment of the objectives of federal non-discrimination
protections. Even though the United States Supreme Court
questioned, but did not answer, whether Section 504 was intended
to “reach only intentional discrimination,”37 other courts have
continued to enforce this unreasonable standard of “bad faith and
gross misjudgment.”38
Over the past decade, disability discrimination claims under
Section 504 and the ADA, which have maintained strong viability in
housing, employment, and other settings, have slowly emerged from
under the shadows of the IDEA’s special education jurisprudence.
These claims have begun to reflect an appreciation for their unique
and important role in civil rights protections for students with
disabilities.39 Concurrent with this evolution, courts and hearing

34. See id. at 283 (explaining how districts’ pleading requirements were
“forcing parents of IDEA students to repackage their Section 504/ADA claims solely
as IDEA claims”).
35. B.M. ex rel. Miller v. S. Callaway R-II Sch. Dist., 732 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir.
2013) (citing Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 2000)).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that “[w]here alleged
ADA and Section 504 violations are based on educational services for disabled
children, the plaintiff must prove that school officials acted in bad faith or with gross
misjudgment.” Id. (quoting Birmingham, 220 F.3d at 856).
36. See, e.g., C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826, 841 (2d Cir.
2014); G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., 711 F.3d 623, 635 (6th Cir. 2013); D.A. ex rel.
Latasha A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2010); Sellers
by Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of City of Mannassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998).
37. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295–97 (1985) (holding unequivocally
that Section 504 reached unintentional discrimination).
38. See supra note 36. It is the authors’ hope that as the understanding that
special education protections do not subsume disability nondiscrimination
protections continues to evolve, courts will reject a “bad faith and gross
misjudgment” standard of proof in favor of a more rational standard.
39. See Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008) (demonstrating that
courts have begun to recognize the protections of the IDEA must not consume the
protections of Section 504 and the ADA). The court in Mark H. concluded that the
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officers have experienced a renewed confusion in determining
when, and to what extent, the administrative hearing procedures of
the IDEA must first be exhausted before pursuing non-IDEA claims,
specifically ADA and Section 504 claims.40
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions41 have provided some
clarity to these questions. In short, this clarity will permit a greater
appreciation of the gravity and distinction between the various
disability discrimination protections for students. It will also reduce
the cost, delays, and frequent errors of the IDEA administrative
hearing process that present insurmountable barriers to justice for
students with disabilities.
III. THE FRY DECISION
Stacy and Brent Fry sued their local and regional school districts
and school principal for violating the ADA and Section 504 by
refusing to allow their daughter, E.F., to bring her trained service
dog to kindergarten.42 E.F.’s service dog, Wonder, provided E.F. the

IDEA provides clear congressional intent to preserve all remedies and rights under
Section 504 and the requirements to provide a free appropriate public education in
each law are “overlapping but different.” Id. at 925. More recently, in cases strongly
supported by the United States Department of Justice, courts have strengthened the
distinct viability of disability discrimination protections for special education
students. See B.C. v. Mt. Vernon Unified Sch. Dist., 837 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2016)
(“Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence, therefore, shows disparate impact under the ADA
and Section 504 only if, as a matter of law, a child with a disability under the IDEA
necessarily qualifies as an individual with a disability under the ADA and Section
504, such that Plaintiffs’ data on children with a disability under the IDEA suffice as
data on individuals with a disability under the ADA and Section 504. We conclude
that this is not the case.”); see also CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 235 (3d
Cir. 2013) (“[C]ompliance with the IDEA does not automatically immunize a party
from liability under the ADA”); K.M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088,
1100–01 (9th Cir. 2013) (determining that compliance with the IDEA does not
necessarily establish compliance with the ADA); D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito,
675 F.3d 26, 42 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Compliance with the IDEA does not necessarily
disprove a claim under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.”).
40. See, e.g., Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“Non-IDEA claims that do not seek relief available under the IDEA are not subject
to the exhaustion requirement, even if they allege injuries that could conceivably
have been redressed by the IDEA.”), invalidated by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162,
1173 (9th Cir. 2014).
41. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988
(2017); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
42. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 750–51.
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assistance E.F. required in daily activities due to her severe form of
cerebral palsy.43 For example, Wonder was trained to perform such
tasks as retrieving dropped items, helping E.F. balance when she
used her walker, opening and closing doors, turning on and off
lights, helping E.F. take off her coat, and helping E.F. transfer to and
from the toilet so that her independence (and one assumes, her
privacy and dignity) could be maximized.44 School officials refused
to allow Wonder into school because a human aide was provided as
part of E.F.’s IEP, and the school concluded this rendered Wonder’s
services superfluous.45
The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR)
determined that the school district’s exclusion of Wonder violated
E.F.’s rights under Title II of the ADA and Section 504.46 The OCR
compared the school officials’ determination that Wonder’s services
were superfluous to a student in a wheelchair who wished to
independently enter a school building using a ramp over being
carried into the building by assistants, or a blind student who
preferred to use a cane over being led around by others.47
The Frys then filed suit seeking declaratory relief and money
damages to compensate for E.F.’s injuries, which included
emotional distress and pain, embarrassment, and mental anguish.48
The district court granted the school district’s motion to dismiss the
suit.49 It held that Section 1415(l) required the Frys to first exhaust
the IDEA’s administrative procedures.50 A divided panel of the Sixth
Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Section 1415(l) applies whenever a
plaintiff’s alleged harms are “educational” in nature.51
The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
Sixth Circuit’s decision.52 The Court held that: (1) if, in a suit
brought under a statute other than the IDEA, the remedy sought is
not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA’s
procedures is unnecessary; and (2) courts should examine the

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 751.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 751–52.
See id. at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id.

622

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:2

gravamen of the complaint to determine whether it seeks relief for
the denial of a FAPE.53 In other words, when the crux of the
complaint reveals that the remedy sought is for the denial of a FAPE,
the IDEA administrative procedures must be exhausted before
lawsuits are filed on ADA and Section 504 claims.54
In coming to this conclusion, the Court in Fry re-traced the
historical treatment by the Supreme Court and Congress of the
interaction between the IDEA and the ADA and Section 504,
beginning with Smith v. Robinson.55 The parents in Smith sought to
secure a FAPE for their child under the IDEA as well as Section 504
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.56 The
Court in Smith held “that the IDEA altogether foreclosed additional
claims . . . [because] its ‘comprehensive’ and ‘carefully tailored’
provisions . . . [created] ‘the exclusive avenue’ through which a child
with a disability (or his parents) could challenge the adequacy of his
education.”57 The Fry Court noted that Congress quickly responded
with the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, now
codified at Section 1415(l), which “overturned Smith’s preclusion of
non-IDEA claims while also adding a carefully defined exhaustion
requirement.”58
The Court in Fry recognized that Section 1415(l) preserves the
distinct viability of non-IDEA claims such as the ADA and Section
504, yet first funnels all claims for relief available under the IDEA
through its administrative hearing process.59 To distinguish between
claims that must be exhausted initially in an IDEA administrative
hearing from claims that may be brought initially in the courts, the
Court first identified that the IDEA’s primary purpose is the
guarantee of a FAPE.60 As such, the Court held that Section 1415’s
“exhaustion rule hinges on whether” the relief sought is an
enforcement of the child’s right to a FAPE.61 If the relief sought is
not redress for the failure to provide a FAPE, even though the
actions that give rise to the student’s claims are related to the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 746–47.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 746 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)).
Id. at 750 (citing Smith, 468 U.S. at 992).
Id. (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 754.
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student’s education, the student need not exhaust the administrative
procedures of the IDEA before bringing suit under separate and
distinct laws such as Section 504 and the ADA.62
The Court rightly observed that there are many reasons that a
child might require an accommodation of her disability in an
educational setting that have nothing to do with the provision of a
FAPE.63 This includes where the ADA or Section 504 otherwise
require the provision of a requested accommodation.64 Under both
the ADA or Section 504, the school has an obligation to provide the
requested accommodation.65 However, unless the accommodation is
required in order to provide a FAPE under the IDEA, an
administrative hearing officer has no authority to require the school
to provide the requested accommodation.66 This is because the
officer is only empowered to enforce the child’s substantive right to
a FAPE.67
Of course, the plaintiff is the master of her own claim.68
However, the Court cautioned that a plaintiff’s artful pleading will
not permit her to escape the administrative exhaustion requirement
of the IDEA if she effectively seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE.69
What matters is the essence of the relief sought, though notably, not
the relief she “could have sought.”70 The plaintiff identifies the relief
she seeks, and her claims are subject to exhaustion, or not, based on
that choice.71 To identify whether a plaintiff seeks relief available
under the IDEA, the Court urged lower courts to consider the
“diverse means and ends” of the statutes that protect the rights of
people with disabilities.72 In particular, the Court suggested
considering the IDEA on the one hand, and the ADA and Section
504 on the other.73
The Court then explored a set of hypothetical questions
intended to assist lower courts in identifying when a plaintiff seeks
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 755.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 755.
Id.

624

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:2

relief for the denial of a FAPE.74 These hypotheticals form a two-part
test.75 First, could the plaintiff have brought the same claim if she
was seeking access to a different kind of public facility?76 For
example, what if E.F. had sought to bring Wonder with her to a
public library?77 And second, could an adult in the school building
bring essentially the same claim?78 Could a teacher, for example,
complain that his rights under the law were violated because he was
barred from bringing his service animal to his place of
employment?79 If the answers to both questions are “yes,” then it is
very unlikely that the student seeks relief for the failure to provide a
FAPE.80 Therefore, the student need not first exhaust the
administrative hearing requirements of the IDEA before her claims
can be heard in court.81
The Court acknowledged that the distinction between a claim
that seeks redress for the failure to provide a FAPE and an
equal-access claim may not always be obvious.82 For example, a
wheelchair-bound student cannot receive a FAPE if she cannot enter
a school building because it lacks a ramp.83 The core of this
complaint would involve access rather than the denial of a FAPE.84
The same type of complaint could stem from the student’s inability
to enter a public library that lacked a ramp.85 Conversely, a student
seeking remedial tutoring in order to gain equal access to a school’s
regular education math curriculum could legally claim that the
failure to provide such tutoring amounts to disability
discrimination.86 However, an adult visiting the school could not
bring such a claim.87 As such, the second student’s claim is one that
is more like the denial of a FAPE.88 The second student would thus

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. at 756.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 756–57.
See id. at 757.
Id.
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be required to first exhaust the administrative procedures made
available under the IDEA before bringing suit under disability
discrimination statutes.89 These examples show that despite the
helpful clarification in the Fry decision, the tools the Court has
provided by way of these hypothetical questions may cause as much
confusion as clarification.
The Court suggested another tool that lower courts can use to
establish the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint and the plaintiff’s
corresponding obligation to first make use of the IDEA’s
administrative hearing procedures: prior pursuit of the IDEA’s
administrative remedies.90 The Court said this “will often provide
strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff’s claim concerns the
denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly uses that
term.”91 In his concurrence in part and concurrence in the
judgment, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, refers to this
additional standard as a “another false clue,” stating that it is “easy to
imagine circumstances under which parents might start down the
IDEA road and then change course and file an action under the ADA
or the Rehabilitation Act that seeks relief that the IDEA cannot
provide.”92 These circumstances could include where parents might
be “advised by their attorney that the relief they were seeking under
the IDEA is not available under that law but is available under
another.”93 Or, “parents might change their minds about the relief
that they want, give up on the relief that the IDEA can provide, and
turn to another statute.”94 The authors agree with Justices Alito and
Thomas that this “clue” involving prior pursuit of the IDEA’s
administrative remedies, in particular, is likely to confuse lower
courts and lead them astray.95
IV. FUTURE UNCERTAINTY
Fry left unanswered two important questions that are likely to
cause future confusion. First, because a FAPE under Section 504
differs from a FAPE under the IDEA, Fry’s reach is unclear. A student

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 759 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id.
Id.
See id.
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receives a Section 504 FAPE when the student is provided with
regular or special education, and related aids and services, that are
designed to meet his or her individual educational needs as
adequately as the needs of students without disabilities are met.96 A
student’s rights under Section 504 are violated when a school does
not provide an education that affords a student equal opportunity to
obtain the same level of academic achievement when the student is
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the student’s needs.97
A student receives a FAPE under the IDEA when the student
receives specially designed instruction and support services that are
reasonably calculated to enable the student to make progress
appropriate in light of the student’s circumstances.98 The IEP for a
child who is fully integrated in the regular classroom should be
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks
and advance from grade to grade.”99 Regardless of the student’s
particular circumstances, the student’s educational program must be
appropriately ambitious in light of those circumstances.100 However,
in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v.
Rowley,101 and in Endrew F,102 the Court specifically rejected the idea
that a FAPE under the IDEA is an education that aims to provide
disabled children substantially equal opportunities as non-disabled
children to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and
contribute to society.
The differing FAPE definitions and Fry’s holding leave unclear
the answer to the following scenario. Assume a school district
provides a student with an education that allows him or her to
advance from grade to grade, and the school also provides that
student with academic opportunities that are not equal to those
provided to his or her peers without disabilities. That student’s claim
will fail the Fry two-part test.103 If the student seeks relief under
96. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b) (2016) (noting that in addition, schools must also
satisfy the requirements of 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.34, 104.35, and 104.36).
97. 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(vii)(2).
98. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988,
999 (2017).
99. Id. at 991.
100. Id. at 1000.
101. 458 U.S. 176, 211 (1982).
102. 137 S. Ct. at 999.
103. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 746, 754 (2017) (holding
that (1) “[I]f, in a suit brought under a different statute, the remedy sought is not
for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is not required;”
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Section 504 or the ADA, what is the student’s obligation to exhaust
the administrative remedies? Under the plain language of Section
1415(l) and the Court’s analysis thereof, the student should not be
subject to the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement
because the student does not seek relief available from a hearing
officer.104 But, despite clear statutory language, Fry’s imperfect test
leaves room for one to argue that administrative exhaustion remains
appropriate.105
Second, the Court left for another day the question of whether
exhaustion of IDEA’s administrative hearing procedures is required
when the plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE under the
IDEA, but seeks only monetary damages, a remedy not within a
hearing officer’s ability to award in an IDEA due process hearing.106
The Frys and the Solicitor General said the answer to that question
is “no.”107 These authors agree. A plain language analysis of Section
1415(l), as endorsed by the Supreme Court in Fry, makes any other
conclusion unlikely. A plaintiff, as master of her claim, chooses
monetary damages as the remedy she seeks. She is under no
obligation to choose different relief that a hearing officer has the
power to award in an administrative hearing under the IDEA, and
no hearing officer may award her the damages she seeks. As such,
under the plain language of Section 1415(l) and the plain language
analysis employed by the Court in Fry, she should be free to bring
her claims to the courts without first exhausting them
administratively.

and (2) “[E]xhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative procedures is unnecessary
where the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit is something other than the denial of the
IDEA’s core guarantee of a FAPE”).
104. See id. at 754 (“[I]f, in a suit brought under a different statute, the remedy
sought is not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is
not required. After all, the plaintiff could not get any relief from those procedures:
A hearing officer . . . would have to send her away empty-handed.”).
105. Id. at 750 (“[A] plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the Rehabilitation
Act, or similar laws must in certain circumstances – that is when seeking relief that
is also available under the IDEA – first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative
procedures.” (internal quotations omitted)).
106. Id. at 752 n.4.
107. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Fry, there was significant
confusion in administrative bodies and courts on the application and
interaction of the special education and disability discrimination
laws.108 Fry provided much-needed guidance on these laws and
fashioned a two-part test for determining their interplay.109 Despite
the test’s apparent limitations, students with disabilities, their
parents, and their advocates have much to appreciate in the Court’s
decision. The Court clarified the manner in which federal special
education and non-discrimination laws overlap but maintain their
separate and distinct viability.110 This clarification spares students
who neither seek nor can obtain relief from a hearing officer under
the IDEA from exhausting the IDEA’s administrative remedies.111
While imperfect, Fry removes significant barriers for students with
disabilities seeking to enforce their rights and therefore represents
an important victory for students with disabilities.112

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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